Sunday, April 1. 2007New Week, Same-O-Same-O In The Mortgage Sector?
Here comes the new week!
Promise guys - this is not an "April Fools" joke. Last Friday we had two bombshells of announcements in the Mortgage Sector - Indymac Bank (NDE) announced that their General Counsel was leaving and Countrywide (CFC) announced that two directors were resigning, one immediately. Now directors do leave and counsel does resign from time to time. But let's examine this just a bit. First, Countrywide. The announcement hit the newswire not only after the close of business but after the close of extended hours trading - at nearly 8:00 PM ET! In the announcement one of the two (Kathleen Brown) resigned immediately, while the other (Michael Dougherty) has "decided not to stand for re-election." Of note is that neither of the resigning directors made a personal statement, nor, does it appear, that the company intends to replace them. The second, IndyMac Bank, was even more puzzling. According to the firm's press release the company said that Mr. Hughes decision to leave was made "several months ago". Well, doesn't anyone find it curious that for a planned departure several months prior wouldn't give the company due time to find - and announce - his replacement? After all, the position of General Counsel is quite an important one in most firms! One must wonder - all these departures with no statement by the person(s) leaving, and, in all three cases, no named replacements? To add a bit of background to this, on Friday M&T Bank announced that it recently had to pull a bond tranche offering because "fewer bids than normal were received and pricing was lower than expected." Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway holds the largest outside shareholding stake in the firm. This announcement smells a lot like "we couldn't sell the loans for more than we had in them, so we decided that rather than lose the money now we'd take the risk they won't default and hold them ourselves." If true, it may be the start of what many (myself included) have predicted - that credit spreads and market conditions have made essentially all low-documentation loans radioactive to the point that nobody will buy them for more than they cost to originate. If this is in fact the case then every single mortgage lender who has offered low or no-documentation loans in the past year, or who offer them today, is likely to find themselves with a severe liquidity problem. For those issuers who have significant concentration of these loans this market development may be severe enough to threaten continuing operations! While smelling dead fish does not decisively mean that indeed there is dead fish inside that mullet wrapper, more often than not when you unwrap it guess what you're gonna find? Anyone remember Enron and Mr. Skilling's departure - for "personal reasons" - shortly before that company blew up? Labels: CFC, mortgage space, NDE, Stink of dead fish Comments
Sunday, April 1. 2007Market Meltdown Coming?
The last few weeks have seen extraordinary price and volatility action on the US Markets. Much of what has driven this has been what many folks are calling a "contained" problem in the subprime mortgage business (this, really, is code for "poor
Anyway, I don't buy it as I've made clear in my blog thus far. I believe the housing problems are not really driven by the mortgage issues per se - that is, that's a symptom, not the root cause of the issue. The root cause of the issue is that home prices are so far out of whack with income levels that the only way half of the citizens of today can afford a house is with exotic and dangerous loan products! What is potentially far worse is that huge percentages of Americans have used their homes as ATM machines - cashing out with home equity lines and refinances. They bought into the "home prices go up in a parabolic curve forever" nonsense and effectively "withdrew" huge amounts of money, putting people who were formerly in safe and secure mortgage products in the same boat as those who bought during the inflation period of the bubble! This problem will not be fixed quickly or painlessly. There is no way to solve it quickly, and there is no way to do so without those who are overextended - about half of the population - taking a haircut of some dimension. We are now arguing about degrees of pain, not whether or not the pain will visit us. At this point the ATM machine is out of money - permanently. Now its hungry and demanding to be serviced! And serviced it will be, one way or another - with disastrous consequences for many. If you remember 1999, there were many who said this time it's different. Well, no, this time it's not different - in fact, it's exactly the same. You can't spend more than you make (unless you're the US Federal Government) for very long and get away with it. Let's add up the headwinds that we are facing in terms of the economy - because, at the end of the day, it is the economy that will drive the markets, not the other way around.
Now let's look at the "fundamental analysis" of the markets. Fundamental analysis encompasses many things, including the earnings growth potential of a given market or stock, its debt levels, and price relative to sales and earnings. The "talking heads" are all talking about single digit growth in earnings this year - and they may be overstating the possibility of a good year for earnings. This is important because right now the S&P 500 is selling at a P/E of about 15.6! The P/E of a stock is usually thought of as "valued fairly" when it is equal to the next year's expected earnings increase in percentage. This means that the S&P 500 is extremely overvalued - by about fifty percent - if indeed earnings are only going to grow in the single digits this year! This is not a positive factor at all. If in fact earnings growth is decelerating, as is predicted, by approximately 12.5%, then the market suddenly looks VERY overvalued! For all of 2006 the s&P500 grew earnings at 13.04%. Zacks expected earnings growth in '07 to be 10.52%, while more recent predictions have been "high single digits." It could be said that the S&P was "slightly overvalued" at the end of 2006. If these deceleration numbers are accurate, then it REALLY looks overvalued now! A peek at the technicals of the market is at least as disturbing. Technical analysis is the viewing of past performance in an effort to glean a hint of where the market is headed in the future. It is not an exact science and in fact is often DEAD WRONG, but it does provide some hints and the strength of the signals given can usually be calibrated in some fashion. Here is a chart of the last year's S&P 500 action: Last summer we moved down to the 1225 level in the S&P, rebounded for a bit, tested that low again and then began to move higher - a move that persisted until the end of February. This is a common pattern - what is called a "double bottom". The decline going into the bottom last summer, however, was fairly orderly - it was not so much a plunge as a slide over the course of a month or so. In February we fell off a cliff. We then tested that low and breached it, then retraced about 3/4 of the loss and failed in the advance at that point. This is fairly negative signal and in fact is sometimes thought of as a "double top", although the more "traditional" pattern retraces all the way back to the top and meets resistance there. What tends to back this, however, as a potential "double top" is the small dip in the middle of February that preceded the plunge - the advance failed there at that point of resistance. A look at the two year chart shows a similar plunge in October of 2005, but that one was followed by a retracement which did not stall out and a subsequent solid advance. Going back even further, to the tech bubble days, we see a more ominous trend. The bubble saw S&P numbers near 1550 at the peak. Those values have not been seen since, and the retracement from those highs was almost fifty percent! Perhaps most importantly, as we approached the 1500 level the advanced stalled and then failed, and has failed a retest. Look at the present day chart, it appears that the trend remains solidly down. If you draw a line from the top of the recent highs through the failed retest, you see a downtrend line that remains unbroken - with lower highs being taken since that failure. In addition volume on up days has been notably weaker than on down days. Markets (or individual stocks) rising on weaker volume is not a good sign. It means that prices are rising more because of fewer sellers than lots of buyers. Volume shows conviction behind the move and is an important confirmatory signal that the move you're seeing is "real". And, as we sit now, it appears that MACD (momentum) is turning negative. What does all of this mean? In my opinion, it means we are headed for lower markets. On a technical analysis perspective I would expect a retest of the lows of February in the 1370 range. If that is violated, and especially if it is violated on heavy volume due to a geopolitical or business blowup of some sort (say, in the mortgage lending space) we could very easily find ourselves back in the 1220 range within a very short period of time. This would be a roughly 15% haircut on the broader markets. Of far more serious concern is the possibility that we fail at the 1220 range. That would put the next real support at the 1175 level and, below that, around 1130. The latter would represent a 20% correction. There is VERY STRONG support around 1070-1090 - failure there takes us under 1000 in very short order, potentially all the way back to the lows of the crash near the 790s! Finally, and possibly most importantly, the yield curve in US Treasuries is present inverted, although mostly at the very-short maturities. This has an extremely high correlation with recessions. While this signal has dissipated a bit in the last couple of weeks it is still worrisome - until a more-normal appearance resumes this is a signal that you must pay attention to due to its very high predictive value. Will it start Monday? This is not possible to know. It is entirely possible that we will first see yet another attempt at an advance, or even two or more. But unless we can break out above the mid February highs in the S&P 500, from a technical analysis perspective the trend is downward! When you add to all of this the economic background issues I just don't see higher markets in the near future, nor do I see support for the "quick recovery" we had going into last fall that led us to the highs we recently enjoyed. Now will the worst happen? Not necessarily. But what I believe, and what I've planned for in my portfolio at the present time, is that we're going to see:
So what do you do if you're in the equities market right now and fearful of trouble? Here's my take:
Remember that in a down market capital preservation is critically important. When the 2000 crash came the indices fell 50%, but many people lost far more than half of their portfolios. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO BOTTOM FISH! Several associates of mine thought "the worst was over" when tech stocks were cut in half, bought in heavily, only to see them collapse to 10% of their former price - or go underwater entirely! If you miss the first 5-10% of the upswing when this is over but only take 10% of the loss that everyone else suffers you will be so far ahead you won't care about not "calling the bottom." There is almost no chance of being right about when "it's over" - if we do see a recession I would not be heavily back into equities on the long side until there is at least one full quarter of solid earnings growth behind us. Until then, I'm remaining defensive. This sort of down move tends to be violent, unanticipated until its well underway (at which point you've already taken BIG losses) and impossible to get good insurance against at any sort of reasonable price once it begins. Therefore, if you are going to hedge your holdings against this sort of damaging market downturn you need to do it BEFORE the plunge occurs - its too late once it starts as the premiums will go through the roof just as they would if you could buy insurance a day before a hurricane was to hit your home! There are some who believe we are headed for a full-on depression. I am not so cynical. I do, however, believe that we are looking at a deep and quite-possibly prolonged recession, followed by several years of very slow economic growth. I also believe that there is no chance that the housing market is going to see any material turnaround until 2010. Mistakes by policy and lawmakers could make the situation far worse, but are unlikely to make it better - the seeds of this problem were sown in the years after the 2000 tech explosion when money basically became "free" (I enjoyed it just like everyone else - I bought a new truck in 2001 with zero interest for three years and no money down), and now the chickens have come home to roost. Comments
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Sunday, April 1. 2007The 900lb Gorilla In The Mortgage (and Homebuilder) Living Room
Yesterday there was an announcement on the wire about Beezer Homes being investigated for alleged mortgage fraud.
Beezer, apparently, was selling these loans off to FHA, which of course got the Fed's to perk up their ears REAL fast, since that's the federal government being ripped off here. Well, now here's the problem. All the lenders have been making these "liar loans". What's a liar loan? I've talked about it before - its a "stated income" loan, or even worse, what's known as "SISA" (stated income, stated assets) Now why, might I ask, would you want such a loan? The apologists all point to things like people with lots of commission income (which might be unstable), a small business which shows a taxable loss (or little profit) but lots of income (how do you do that, exactly, and legally not pay taxes?), or a second person in the home who is going to help with the mortgage payments (so why can't they document their income and your relationship to them so that the lender can evaluate the risk of them "disappearing"?) See, what it comes down to in each of these cases - and many more - is that people simply don't want to document their income because if they did then the lender could qualify the quality of that income stream and what the odds are of it becoming impaired or disappearing entirely! But isn't that precisely the purpose and intent of underwriting loans? That is, figuring out what the person's likelihood of repayment is before you lend the money? When you offer a product that is intentionally designed to allow people to avoid safe underwriting guidelines, how do you argue that this is not an inducement to commit fraud or part of the fraud itself? I argue you cannot. While "private action", as Bernacke said today, does provide bondholders with options if and when they find out that these loans really are "liars loans", there is, in fact, a government tie-in - and a reason why, in my opinion, federal prosecutorial action is extremely likely against all of these lenders. That is the fact that these organizations didn't keep the risk for themselves. They attempted to pass it off on other people by turning these mortgages into tranches of debt - essentially bonds - and then sold them off into the market with limited recourse. They did so knowing that they intentionally did not verify the income and assets of the borrowers even though they were able to if they had wanted to. And, they passed the bag to others. Now that's bad enough. But what's worse, and why I believe that federal criminal action may come down on these people, is that pension funds bought many of these CDOs! And that's a problem, because if and when pension funds blow up, their obligations become obligations of the PBGC (Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation), a chartered corporation set up under ERISA. This is the "hook" that federal prosecutors need to start sticking their heads under the kimono. When it starts, I predict it will be fast and furious. Beezer Homes is, in my opinion, just the tip of this iceberg. Comments
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Sunday, April 1. 2007Possible Mortgage FRAUD by Lenders (NDE, CFC) - Developing
Yesterday I opined that Countrywide's Samuels all but admitted fraud while in the hearings on the Subprime mess on Capitol Hill.
It appears that I wasn't the only one to get that idea. This morning a lawsuit was announced against Countrywide (CFC) and Indymac (NDE), alleging the same thing. But I'd like to explore this a bit further. Consider this - if you qualify someone on a "Teaser Rate" for their mortgage, or on the basis of an "Option ARM" minimum payment, this doesn't just have suitability problems. It also has "churning" problems, and arguably, was undertaken just for your benefit as a lender and all in the food chain for lenders, and has nothing to do with the suitability or even the benefit for a borrower! In fact, it can be argued that such a practice is almost never suitable or appropriate for a borrower! How's that? Well, most people when they take a mortgage, intend that eventually they will own their home free and clear, yes? Ok, so you're a lender, and you get Joe to come in for a mortgage. You qualify him for a "Teaser Rate" and under that Teaser Rate his DTI (Debt-to-income) is a reasonable 36%. He goes out and buys the house. But under the fully-indexed rate, which he will be required to pay in a year or so, his DTI is 60%! You know in advance that he cannot make that payment because you qualified him originally, and you knew his DTI at the time. What are the odds that he will earn TWICE as much money in a year? For 99% of the borrowers - ZERO. You'd say "Heh, that's fraud right up front!" But that's not really the worst of it, nor is it why I believe that perhaps - just perhaps - these guys might have breached the RICO (yes, Racketeering) laws. Here might be why you made that loan - You know that Joe, in a year, now owning that house, will be forced to come back and get a NEW mortgage in another year! This will generate fees for you, for the mortgage broker, for the appraiser and for the title insurance company. While the appraiser doesn't work for you all these of these either do or might, and for you and the broker, this is an income stream that would be FIVE TIMES OR MORE the expected income stream. See, if someone has a conventional 5/1 ARM with no teaser, they have no reason to come back (other than market conditions) for five years. If they have a 30/fixed, they have no reason to come back at all! But if they are qualified on a teaser rate mortgage which you know they cannot repay once it indexes off the teaser rate, then they are forced to return for a new loan when that teaser expires. What's worse, this is never in the best interest of the homeowner, because he pays all those costs every time, and so long as you maintain this scheme he also never gets any closer to owning his home outright! Guys, this is where the real fraud is. Isn't this a whole lot like how crack dealers get their customers? "The first hit is free!" is the siren song, and indeed, the first hit is free. But the second, well, that'll cost you - a bit. The third costs more. And by the time you're good and hooked, well, those hits get really expensive. So let's see, we take Mr. Homeowner-To-Be who wants to buy a $600,000 home. Problem is, he only makes $100,000 a year, or $8,333 a month. With a "Teaser" rate of 2%, his P&I is $2,214.03 - 27% DTI on the mortgage - very workable. Ok, now the teaser expires, and the indexed rate is LIBOR + 1, or 6.2% (today). Now his payment is $3655.92, which is 44% DTI for his mortgage alone! If he's also got a $500 a month car payment and $300 a month in credit card bills, his total "nut" now approaches 67% DTI! And guess what - he's got 35% of his money being withheld for income tax! He is now screwed, blued and tattooed. Seeing this coming, he runs back to the mortgage office and hollers and yells! And, they sell him a new mortgage - carrying back the difference between the 2% and 6.2% negative amortization into the balance! Now his DTI is 29% and he goes home again.... for another year... and does it again........ Until the housing market stops appreciating, at which point he's got more debt than equity in the house! What's worse, he hasn't paid down any of the home's principle balance - to the contrary, the principle has actually gone UP! And now our homeowner is hooked. He can't refinance out to a 30/fixed, because he couldn't afford the house in the first place, and still can't on a DTI basis. He can't sell it without taking a $50,000 loss. He can refi until he hits the 100% LTV cap on the refinance, but as he gets closer and closer the risk premium goes up and so does his "indexed" interest rate, making the negative amortization worse and worse with each go-around! This cycle ultimately ends in foreclosure. The homebuyer was fed his first hit of mortgage crack, he smoked it, and now, having smoked it, he gets more and more hooked with each successive puff - until he smokes himself quite literally to death. How's this become racketeering? Simple - all racketeering requires is that two or more people conspire to commit a fraud. And oh, by the way, racketeering is one of the "triple damage" deals - that is, if you can prove that there was a conspiracy to commit it, you can sue not just for your harm but for three times the amount you were screwed out of. Now there will be those who will argue that "but the borrower was the one who came in and asked for the loan to buy that house!" And you'd be right - Joe indeed did do so. But Mr. Mortgage Broker is the expert in mortgages, not the starry-eyed buyer. We have in place a requirement that investments be suitable for a person's investment goals and appetite for risk when recommended by others in the securities industry. It is illegal for a securities broker or investment manager to recommend that you buy, for example, AGIX stock (a VERY high-risk biotech) unless your investment goals include speculation. Certainly, such an "investment" is not suitable for someone who is on a fixed income and cannot afford capital losses! Yet we heard, yesterday, that Mr. Samuels from Countrywide EXPLICITLY DISCLAIMED any responsibility whatsoever for suitability screening in how his mortgage products are offered to homebuyers! Simply put: These loans should have never been made. If you can't qualify on the fully-indexed rate rather than the teaser, meaning your DTI is over 36% at that rate, you cannot afford the house! Are there exceptions? Sure. An Option ARM might make sense for someone who is buying a replacement home and can't quality for two "full-load" mortgages. He'll be out of the first house (and thus have his capital back) within six months to a year, before the "Option Bomb" blows up, will refi to a conventional loan and use some or all of his net proceeds to pay down the principle. But for the owner or investment property buyer? Show me one scenario where qualifying someone on a teaser rate, when they cannot quality on the indexed rate, is a good idea for them. And, by the way, if you cite a "rapidly rising home market" what you've just told me is that you think people ought to be able to buy homes on 100% margin. We tried that (actually 90%) with stocks in 1929, and we know how it ended. Disclosure: I'm short a bunch of these companies.... I knew I smelled dead fish. Comments
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Sunday, April 1. 2007Subprime Hearings - HOLY CRAP!
Oh boy........
A few snippets from the hearings today that Chris Dodd's Banking Committee is having on Subprime Mortgages: Sandra Thompson of the FDIC: "1.2 Trillion in subprime loans; 14% are delinquent as of 4Q06, and certainly higher now." (That'd be 190 BILLION) "Interest rates to reset; NEXT YEAR 800,000 ARMs will reset UPWARD." "Interest rates will adjust upward, not downward." "We are JUST TOUCHING THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG" - Senator Shelby "Exotic Loans" was said..... and that ARM comment wasn't Subprime-restricted guys and gals... "There better be concern for risk" - Shelby "Why would you make a teaser rate loan to someone with no money down? ..... you have a fee-driven machine..... animal instincts got control of the market....." - Joseph Smith, a bank regulator, explaining that the broker and lenders mark all this up and make money, and how they "sausage" the loans to get them to "AAA" debt tranches (oh boy, can you spell F.R.A.U.D.?) Animal instincts? "A tsunami of foreclosures is on the horizon" - Senator Menendez (Tsunami? How high is the ground you're standing on there Mr. Investor... and Mr. Consumer!) "We need to make sure borrowers are qualified and can afford the loans they are given" - Senator Menendez (There goes any hope of these guys being able to refi out - BOOM!) "We could have done more sooner. What we have observed is risk layering in the extreme; in 2006 risk layering really started to compound..that made these loans unviable." - Roger Cole, Fed Reserve "Making loans that are unsustainable from the date of inception is an unsafe and unsound practice." (answer to Q from Mel Martinez, sorry didn't get the name of the witness) "What's happened already has to stop" - Chris Dodd at recess..... "We think we ought to give people a choice between a fixed-rate loan and ARM for which they can qualify" - Samuelson of Countrywide - but let's not forget what the PR out this morning from the company said: "The company believes that there was overcapacity in the mortgage market in 2004, the company said, and does not agree with federal regulators that borrowers should be approved at the "fully indexed rate" that considers the long-term costs of the loan." (Translation: We don't give a damn whether or not you can make the payments after the first one, two or five years; that's your problem, not ours!) "One in four Latino homeowners is predicted to lose their home in the next four years.... families have been matched to loans they cannot afford...... they had a stated-income ARM that had income listed at thousands over what they actually made.... the broker sold her the one that was the easiest to process and earned him the highest return..... families are getting matched to risky products without regard to their credit risk.... brokers must be held accountable to the borrowers they serve." - Janis Bowdler, NCLR (and this is just a "subprime" problem, right?) "The subprime mortgage market .... has been fueled by a complete collapse of responsible underwriting principles... blatant fraud and abuse..... exploitative lending practices...... this fraud-infested market has been producing little social benefit...... unprecedented levels of foreclosure and equity theft happening in full view of banking regulators....... the majority of the loans are to existing homeowners who are being convinced to refinance their debt inappropriately.... the opportunity lies with the broker or lender profiting on the deal..... in fact the subprime portion of the market has been steadily rising; scant little evidence of credit repair..... exploding ADJUSTABLE MORTGAGES WITH TEASER RATES UNDERWRITTEN TO THE TEASER RATE; no evidence of borrower repayment ability; hybrid ARMs needs to be banned..... prepayment penalty locks them in if they discover how they've been scammed and try to get out...... the coming foreclosure crisis SHOULD NOT BE A SURPRISE TO ANYONE......" - Irv Ackelsberg (Consumer Attorney) "If the hybrid ARM borrowers what DTI would be at fully-indexed rate" - (Dodd Q) Answers: 60% of people would not be able to qualify at the fully-indexed rate (Samuels; CFC); approximately 40% would not qualify (another - HSBC?); Some DTI ratios could be as high as 70% (Mr. Dodd again, claiming he has written testimony backing this) "Borrowers would have paid a lower rate for a 30/Fixed with documentation than on a 2/28 ARM; would qual at 8.75% on 30/F; 2/28 would cost 9.5%" - Dodd on credit-impaired borrowers and real costs. "Much of these transactions if you look at them make no sense whatsoever if you look at them from the standpoint of the consumer" - Irv Ackelsberg "The real market demand here is for bond securities on Wall Street" - Irv "We are a mortgage lender do not hold ourselves out as a fiduciary to the borrower" - Sameuls, CFC (Oh really? So let me see if I have this right - you have no obligation whatsoever to consider whether someone can afford a loan or whether it is an appropriate product - your only obligation is to make as much money as you can, irrespective of whether it screws everyone you deal with or not! Do I have that right Mr. Samuels?) "I feel like they took advantage of me because I'm 77; they figured 'oh well she's old and will die soon and we'll take over'" - Ms. Haliburton. "These teaser rates are a critical bridge for our customers" - quoting an advertisement from one of these originators by Mr. Dodd, now showing that these rates are being used to qualify people on fixed income..... "It makes the loan affordable" - Mr. Dodd on the teaser rate's purpose to Samuels; Dodd then nails him with the fact that if she was to refi into a prime loan she'd actually pay MORE, and can't qual, because the teaser rate is the only thing she qualifies for! Now let's distill all this down a bit. ALT-A is at least three times the Subprime volume. Let's call it $4 trillion in these "ARM/Option-ARM" loans in the Subprime and ALT-A spaces over the last two years. That's probably conservative - the Credit Suisse report, if you extrapolate, looks like maybe as much as $6-8 trillion. Let's also be conservative and say that the 14% of Subprime foreclosures from 4Q06 won't go up (horsecrap) and that the ALT-A default rate will be much lower; we'll assign a BLENDED default rate of 10%. That'd be four hundred billion dollars worth of defaults over the next 12 months alone, and the worst part of the ALT-A hard resets won't come until 2008 and 2009! This is going to be "contained"? Horseshit. Second, let's look at Samuels' line of crap about the loan to Ms. Haliburton. A 77 year old woman is going to take a "Prime" loan? On what basis? She's going to mortgage her house for.....what? And if she can't qualify except on a teaser rate now, can she later? That's a big fat NO, even if her credit record improves in a year or two! Why? Because her DTI will actually go UP - she's on a fixed income and the indexed P&I rate on the PRIME loan will always be higher than the teaser rate on the 2/28! Finally, what may be the most important piece of information out of the hearings: 40-60% (depending on the lender) of all borrowers would not be able to qualify for their mortgage if they were forced to qual on the fully-indexed rate for the product they were offered. Go back and read this again folks. Then read it again. And again. Let it sink in. Half of the customers of these firms over the last two years could not afford the house they bought because they could not afford the fully indexed rate on a mortgage - whether it be a conventional fixed product or some form of ARM! Again - approximately one half of all mortgage originations over the last two years should not have happened at all, and if these rules are put in place going forward, one half of all originations will disappear from mortgage broker's offices and mortgage companies. Now ask yourself - how many of the companies in this space survive if they (1) have to deal with the inevitable regulation, back-charges and lawsuits that will come out of this in the next year or two, and (2) their income stream from new customers is cut by 50% at the same time. This smells like ENRON and MCI/Worldcom all over again. Stay tuned - this is gonna get ugly. Really ugly. The worst part of it? Its getting little exposure in the media, and is being played as a "Subprime" mess. Its not. This is a generalized mortgage mess, and the worst part of it is still hidden under the surface. Comments
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